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Summary and Conclusions 
This report starts discussing a number of possible risk analysis methods related to five 
challenges identified by SINTEF within offshore renewable wind energy industry, and it ends 
up with case studies on two challenges by testing SPAR-H method and proposing risk 
reducing measures.   
I answer to all the questions, which are defined in the thesis assignment, by first selecting all 
the five safety challenges. I consider different risk analysis techniques and suggest a few of 
them for each individual challenges in a tabular fashion. I describe the proposed risk analysis 
techniques with their strengths and limitation and discuss, to a considerable extent, how 
they can be related to the challenges. The risk analysis techniques I suggested includes both 
technical and human error related methods. The technical related methods are based on 
some available risk analysis methods which are broadly acceptable in different applications. 
The human error analysis techniques, which have been practiced in nuclear industry, are the 
main focus in this report as it is believed that the techniques are applicable in the offshore 
wind firm industry. 
Among the different challenges in HSE offshore wind farm operation, two challenges: 
collision (between the vessel and the wind turbine) and Access or egress from/to the 
offshore installation are presented as the main important part in the report. Because 
accident is most likely to happen when personnel transfer is required. Possible human errors 
and probability of accident due to those errors are broadly discussed. Possible risk-reducing 
measures to reduce the identified human errors and recommendation which may prevent 
the potential accident are discussed at the end of the project. More detail could be found at 
the end part of the report. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
This report is carried out as part of my master thesis during the spring semester of 2012. This 
is a required master thesis by department of production and quality engineering, University 
of NTNU. The title of this thesis is risk analysis methods within offshore wind energy 
utilization. 
Due to an increase in energy consumption, rising fuel costs and concern about global climate 
change, it is believed that utilization of renewable energy offshore wind will provide a better 
solution in the coming future. To increase the utilization of renewable energy offshore wind, 
technology is believed to be implemented on a large scale in the coming decades. Future 
offshore wind turbines are huge and will be operated in a harsh weather. The problem is 
that unlike the other operations such as oil and gas industries, the offshore renewable 
energy industry is immature and information needed on the point of HSE is hardly available. 
Since the offshore wind farms have only started since the past few decades, safety related 
factors have not been properly analyzed. Only few HSE data have been collected from some 
offshore wind firms for safety culture and the risks associated with wind farm have not been 
properly identified. Thus, it is of great important that risk analysis is properly done from the 
early state of wind energy project development to avoid harm to human, environment and 
material values.  
There are different challenges such as falling objects during installation, accident during 
transport due to the size of the wind turbine components or their heavy weight, accident 
during maintenance due to unstable weather conditions (e.g. wave, wind or current), ship 
collision between wind turbine and ship etc.. Most of these challenges are new and 
considerably different from other marine activities, so it is of great important that several 
new measures for offshore wind energy operations in different scenarios are taken into 
account in necessary risk analysis.  
SINTEF report (Tveiten et al. 2011) has identified five important HSE challenges:  (1) Falling 
objects during lifting operations, (2) Ship collisions within the wind farm, (3) Man overboard 
related to access to, and egress from wind turbines, (4) Occupational accidents related to 
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working at height and (5) Challenges related to emergency handling. These challenges are 
only recognized in the report without concrete analysis or discussion, thus digging deeper 
into these safety challenges still remain.     
1.2 Objective 
The main objectives of the thesis work is to figure out relevant risk analysis techniques for 
the five challenges identified by SINTEF (Tveiten et al. 2011) and provide some suggestions 
for further risk assessment in one or two challenges. To achieve that, I need to:  
1. Select three or more safety challenges based on earlier work by SINFEF report. 
2. Propose relevant risk analysis techniques for these challenges. 
3. Propose a complete set of risk analysis techniques to apply for each of these safety 
challenges. 
4. Demonstrate the techniques for the selected safety challenges which include 
preliminary assessment data such as human error probabilities, weather data, 
operational limits related to, e.g., wave height etc.  
5. Propose risk reducing measures and procedures to reduce risk. 
Expected sub-objectives are: 
1. To get familiar with different methods or tools to systematically identify human 
erroneous actions. 
2. To understand a HRA method or more as the main tool to apply for the selected 
challenges. 
3. To apply the methods on a case or more in order to get experience with the 
methods. 
4. To investigate strengths and weaknesses of the HRA method. 
1.3 Research approach 
In order to achieve the main objectives the first step will be to perform literature studies on 
different risk analysis techniques and find out how they may be related to the challenges 
identified by SINTEF.  Since the main focus in this report is considered to be human reliability 
analysis by both the supervisor and the report writer, the second step is to study some 
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specific available methods or tools within human reliability analysis so that it would be 
possible to systematically identify human errors.  
In order to identify possible human errors, I should consider a task or source related to the 
selected challenge where I can retrieve human errors which than can be used for input in a 
HRA method. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) and Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD) will 
first be studied and used as a starting point because these will provide the source where 
human errors can be identified.  
By going through a case study or more, I will try to collect all the possible human errors and 
find out the probability of accident (or incident) resulted from the identified human errors. 
After that I will study and test at least one HRA method into more detail in order to learn the 
method and to find out possible accidents due to the identified human errors. 
By which way I will be able to highlight a risk picture for the selected challenges from a point 
of human reliability analysis. In addition, I will be able to investigate strengths and 
weaknesses of the chosen HRA method. Finally, risk reducing measures will be presented 
according to what have been found from the performed HRA risk analysis. 
1.4 Limitations 
Although, the report has reached its aims, there were some unavoidable limitations. Initially, 
the work was to begin with all the five challenges which SINFET report has stated, but due to 
the time limit, only two of the challenges (ship collision when approaching wind turbine and 
access or egress when personnel transfer is required) are focused in the report from the 
aspect of HRA method. Unfortunately, equipment and mechanical related factors are not 
part of the report. This study should also have involved applying different risk analysis 
methods for the different challenges. The student’s lack of previous knowledge about HRA 
method, to some extent, may affect the result of the report. A more considerable time 
should be available to get familiar with HRA methods. Available literatures or relevant 
sources related to HRA methods are also too limited. The paper selects only the SPAR-H 
method so no comparison between the different HRA methods could be part of the report.  
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2 Theory  
To define the words of “risk analysis” has been considered to be a problem. Some 
alternative definitions are: “Risk is an expression of the combination of probability for and 
consequence of an unwanted event (Norsk Standard 5814:2008), Risk is the combination of 
the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of the harm (NORSOK Z-013/ISO-IEC 
Guide 51), and Risk is the potential for realization of unwanted, adverse consequences to 
human life, health, property, or the environment: estimation of risk is usually based on the 
expected value of the conditional probability of the event occurring times the consequence of 
the event given that it has occurred (Society of Risk Analysis Glossary)” (Haugen 2010).  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
As we could see from Figure 1, a bow-tie model may be useful for illustrating risk analysis. 
Risk analysis can be quantitative or qualitative and may be applied in various sectors such as 
nuclear power, offshore, process, aerospace, aviation, railway, marine, etc.  
Some of the important standards are: 
- NS5814:2008: Requirements for Risk Assessment 
o General risk analysis standard 
- NORSOK Z-013: Risk and Emergency Preparedness Analysis, Rev 2, 1.9.2001 
o Specifically for use within the offshore industry 
- ISO-IEC Guide 51: Safety aspects – Guidelines for their inclusion in standards 
o Terminology 
Accidental event Consequ-
ence 
Hazards, 
threats 
Causal analysis  
 
Consequence analysis 
 
Figure 1: A simple bow-tie model. 
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- ISO 31010:2009: Risk Management – Risk Assessment Techniques 
Although there is still no unified terminology or standard framework, numerous laws and 
regulations are required for carrying out risk assessments (Rausand 2011). A risk analysis 
requires several steps depending on type of the technique and the application area. Figure 2 
explains the main process of a risk analysis in a four step process. The same process reflects 
in human reliability analysis (HRA) which will be coming at the end of this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
2.1 State of the ark and brief literature review in marine operation 
There is no significant volume of literature which covers risk analysis methods in marine 
operation in spite of several attempts during this report period. A few sources such as ship 
collision estimation models for offshore operation and wind farm operations are identified. 
As these are commercial and software based models, no further information is available. A 
number of collisions between offshore platform and ship have been experienced in the past, 
and many relevant risk assessments have obviously been performed to a considerable 
extend. Risk assessment methods from oil industry, if available, are believed to be easily 
transferred to offshore wind farm industry. 
Various organizations have developed their own model to estimate the probability of ship 
collision. Some of the models are considered to be appropriate for offshore wind farms. 
Appendix 4 illustrates all the available software models including references and the 
company/organization that develop the models.  
Risk identification 
Risk accessment 
Risk evaluation 
Risk reduction 
Figure 2: A risk analysis process 
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The software COLLIDE and SOCRA have been used for risk analysis within offshore wind 
farms (Joanne Ellis 2008). (MARIN) claims that their software SAMSON has been used for 
different calculations such as calculation of the probability and expected number of fatalities 
(human safety), estimation of the risk of a collision of passing ships with the offshore wind 
farm, rerouting shipping traffic alongside the offshore wind farms, etc.  
There exist other marine related risk analysis techniques which are developed to estimate 
collision and grounding risk, but they are not mentioned in Appendix 4. These are GRACAT 
(Grounding and Collision Analysis Toolbox), BaSSy Tool (A successor of the GRACAT software) 
and IWRAP MAK II (IALA Waterway Risk Assessment Program), SHIPCOF and MARTRAM 
(Marine Traffic Risk Assessment Model) (Nyman 2008).  
These models are also presented in (Karin af Geijerstam 2008) stating: “The models are in 
general pretty similar and the common approach is to estimate the number of possible 
collisions and multiply this with an estimated fraction of when a collision occurs. The 
causation factor considers the probability that a collision will not be detected and avoided. 
The models are based on the assumption that the collision frequency is proportional to the 
quantity of ships passing an offshore installation.” (Karin af Geijerstam 2008)provides a bit 
more discussion about COLLIDE and CRASH which seem to be the most frequent used 
models within offshore continental Shelf. The model used in COLLIDE is quite similar to 
CRASH.  (Kleissen 2006) describes SAMSON model with basic model inputs, assumptions and 
parameters used in the calculation, but any description about the program itself and risk 
calculations by the program are not included.  The model MARCS could be found in 
(Christensen 2007) which briefly explains the most important assumptions and input 
parameters to the model and collision due to human failure and technical failure is shortly 
presented. 
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2.2 Suggested risk analysis techniques 
This section contains 2 parts: Part I includes FMECA, FTA, ETA, CHECKLIST METHOD and 
SWIFT. Part II is only Human Error related risk analysis techniques. In both parts, all the 
suggested risk analysis techniques are collected in tabular form. The main purpose is to show 
how each method is considered and how they may be suitable to individual safety challenges 
by the SINTEF report. Since human error usually plays a significant role in the contribution of 
accident occurrence, it would be reasonable to recommend that human related risk 
assessment be given priority.  
FTA, ETA and Checklist method are commonly used applications. FMECA refers mainly to 
analyze components in a technical system, but still the technique is considered appropriate 
e.g. for falling object during lifting operation in the report.  Checklist method is considered 
for every challenge including emergency preparedness.   
The HRA presented in Part II may be qualitative or quantitative and all of them are 
considered to be relevant for all the 5 challenges. Many of the identified HRA techniques 
from the literature study are for nuclear industry and there is no clear signal to transfer their 
applicability to wind farm industry. But it is strongly believed that some of them could be 
applicable for risk assessment within offshore wind farm industry. 
In fact, selecting the most appropriate risk analysis technique is often difficult. In some 
organizations, risk evaluation team has to choose the most appropriate method. For an 
inexperienced analyst it can be very challenging to figure out the best techniques for a 
specific application. (Bridges 2004) states: “The thought process behind hazard evaluation 
techniques is complex, and a variety of factors can influence that decision-making process.” 
Several factors are to consider before choosing an appropriate technique depending on type 
of results needed, resource availability, type of information available, etc.  
Appendix 6 provides a good example which could be helpful to choose the most appropriate 
technique depending on the complexity of the task, application area, process type etc. It 
provides for both quantitative and quantitative risk assessments. It may be many possible 
risk analysis techniques which could be selected for offshore wind farm operation.  
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2.2.1 Part I 
The proposed risk analysis techniques in part I are selectively chosen, for the different 
challenges, based on some available risk analysis methods which are broadly acceptable in 
different applications. This includes FMECA, FTA, ETA, CHECKLIST METHOD and SWIFT. FTA, 
ETA and CHECKLIST METHOD are commonly used techniques. FMECA refers mainly to 
analyze components in a technical system, but the technique is still considered appropriate 
for falling object during lifting operation.  Checklist method is considered for every challenge 
including emergency preparedness. 
Table 1:  Risk analysis techniques considered appropriate for safety challenges in offshore wind 
farm 
    Challenges 
 
 
Risk 
analysis 
techniques 
Falling objects 
during lifting 
operations 
Ship collisions 
within the 
wind farm 
Man 
overboard 
related to 
access to, and 
egress from 
wind turbines 
Occupational 
accidents 
related to 
working at 
height 
Challenges 
related to 
emergency 
handling 
1. FMECA X     
Description 
 
 “Crane operation is an inherent part of offshore oil and gas operations, lifting 
a multitude of supplies and materials to and from offshore facilities. Injuries 
and dangerous occurrences arising from lifting operations account for about 
20% of the total of those occurring offshore.  Actions that should be taken, 
including undertaking a failure mode effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) 
study to identify safety critical parts of the crane.” (HSE). 
 
Strengths and weaknesses (Mohr 1994): 
“Strengths: 
• Frequently, human errors and hostile environments are overlooked. 
• Because the technique examines individual faults of system elements 
taken singly, the combined effects of coexisting failures are not 
considered. 
• If the system is at all complex and if the analysis extends to the 
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assembly level or lower, the process can be extraordinarily tedious and 
time consuming. 
• Failure probabilities can be hard to obtain; obtaining, interpreting, and 
applying those data to unique or high-stress systems introduces 
uncertainty which itself may be hard to evaluate 
Weaknesses: 
• Discovers potential single-point failures. 
• Assesses risk (FMECA) for potential, single-element failures for each 
identified target, within each mission phase. 
• Knowing these things helps to: 
• Optimize reliability, hence mission accomplishment. 
• Guide design evaluation and improvement. 
• Guide design of system to “fail safe” or crash softly. 
• Guide design of system to operate satisfactorily using equipment of 
“low” reliability. 
• Guide component/manufacturer selection. 
• High-risk hazards found in a PHA can be analyzed to the piece-part level 
using FMEA. 
• Hazards caused by failures identified in the FMEA can be added to the PHA, 
if they haven’t already been logged there. 
• FMEA complements Fault Tree Analysis and other techniques.” 
 
Falling objects may occur in any of the three different phases: installation, 
operation and maintenance. Accident that may happen from any phases can 
cause serious injuries, material losses and such. Since FMECA analysis mainly 
refers to component failures, the tool could be appropriated to analyze 
component failures of lifting machine such as crane or helicopter to minimize 
the risk of falling object. Hydraulic system, thruster, winch etc. could be the 
root causes in case of falling objects.  In general the components of an 
offshore wind turbine are designed and produced separately before installing 
as a whole at the final location on the sea. These heavy components are lifted 
by enormous cranes to set up a complete installation at the site. Engineers 
should ensure that the wind turbine components during lifting operation do 
not fall down due to mechanical failure.  FMECA may be conducted to analyze 
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major failures which may result from lifting equipment. 
 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
2. FTA X X X X  
Description A Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) may be used for qualitative and quantitative risk 
analysis or both depending on depending on the scope of the analysis. The 
method is commonly used for risk and reliability studies and has been used 
within the nuclear, chemical and aerospace industries. This analysis has 
traditionally been applied to mechanical and electromechanical, but may also 
be applied to any type of system (Rausand 2011). 
FTA is regarded very often to be one of applicable tools in marine risk 
assessment. FTA could be used for researching factors and causes 
contributing to accident within offshore wind farm operation. The method 
can focus on critical events such as loss of power, collision between ship and 
wind farm (Joanne Ellis 2005). 
Danaher states that Fault tree analysis is the most commonly used technique 
in both reliability engineering and system safety engineering in almost every 
engineering study and it has one or more purposes: 
1. “Estimation of the likelihood of the occurrence of a particular incident. 
2. Determination of the combinations of equipment failures, operating 
conditions, and human errors that contribute to an incident.  
3. Identification of remedial measures and their impact.” 
4.  
Strengths and weaknesses (Danaher) 
“Strengths:   
• Systematic. 
• Probabilities of undesirable outcomes can be calculated. 
• The analysis could be widely used for qualitative or quantitative.  
Weaknesses:  
• It requires a complete understanding. 
• It requires sometimes a very large Tree which needs to be developed 
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depending on the system. 
• A great deal of effort is usually required to develop the fault tree. 
• There is a potential for error if failure or causation paths are omitted. 
• There is no unique Tree.” 
The strengths and the weaknesses are further discussed in more detail in 
(Rausand 2011). 
It could be determined that FTA can be used to examine possible events for 
falling object during lifting operation, ship collision, personnel falling from the 
wind turbine or occupational accidents related to working at height. There is 
also questionable if the tool is appropriate for emergency handling, but any 
supported materials were not yet found from the literature search. 
 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
ETA X X X X  
Description Event tree analysis (ETA) can be used to analyze all types of technical systems, 
with or without operators. It can be both qualitative, quantitative, or both, 
depending on the objective of the analysis and the availability of relevant 
data. Event tree analysis is also commonly used for human reliability 
assessment and has been used successfully in the nuclear industry, the 
chemical process industry, and in several other application areas(Rausand 
2011). 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses (Rausand 2011): 
“Strengths: 
• It is widely used and well accepted. 
• Is well documented and simple to use. 
• Clearly presents the event sequences following a hazardous event and 
the consequence spectrum. 
• It provides a good basis for evaluating the need for new or improved 
barriers. 
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• It can be used to justify allocation of resources for improvements. 
• It can identify system weakness and single-point failures. 
• It does not require that end events need to be foreseen. 
Weaknesses: 
• It has no accepted standard for the graphical layout of the event tree. 
• It requires that sequence of pivotal events has to be foreseen. 
• It requires that hazardous events must be analyzed one by one. 
• It does not facilitate incorporation of partial successes or failures. 
• It is not well suited for handling dependencies in the quantitative 
analysis. 
• It does not show acts of omission.” 
 
Even though there is no materials available in relation to the above four 
selected challenges, it can be considered that Event tree analysis is 
appropriate. It has also been discussed in other application areas of offshore 
operation, e.g., by (Vinnem) or (Spouge 1999). 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
Checklist 
Method 
X X X X X 
Description CHECKLIST approaches are used in a wide range of application areas and for 
many different purposes. CHECKLISTS have been used further to ensure that 
organizations are complying with standard practices. Hazard checklists may 
be useful as part of other and more detailed hazard identification methods 
(Rausand 2011). 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses (Rausand 2011): 
“Strengths: 
• It can be used by non-system experts. 
• It makes use of experience from previous risk assessment. 
• It ensures that common and more obvious problems are not 
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overlooked. 
• It is valuable in the design process for revealing hazards otherwise 
overlooked. 
• It requires minimal information about the installation, and so is 
suitable for concept design. 
Weaknesses: 
• It is limited to previous experience, and thus may not anticipate 
hazards in novel designs or novel accidents form existing designs. 
• It can miss hazards that have not been seen previously. 
• It does not encourage intuitive/brainstorming thinking, and gives 
limited insight into the nature of the hazards related to the study 
object.” 
 
CHECKLIST METHOD is one of hazard identification methods, and since it is 
useful for most risk assessments it could be assumed that this method is 
appropriate for any of all the challenges in offshore wind farms.  
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
SWIFT X X X X X 
Description A SWIFT analysis is most often carried out after a preliminary hazard analysis. 
The analysis may be applied to work procedures and is usually based on a task 
analysis (Rausand 2011). 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses(Rausand 2011): 
“Strengths: 
• It is very flexible, and applicable to any type of installation, operation, 
or process, at any stage of the life cycle. 
• It creates a detailed and auditable record of the hazard identification 
process. 
• It uses experience of operating personnel as part of the team. 
• It is quick, because it avoids repetitive considerations of deviations. 
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• It is less time-consuming than other systematic techniques. 
Weaknesses: 
• It is not inherently thorough and foolproof. 
• It works at the system level, such that lower-level hazards may be 
omitted. 
• It is difficult to audit. 
• It is highly dependent on checklists prepared in advance. 
• It is heavily dependent on the experience of the leader and the 
knowledge of the team.” 
 
What-if analysis maybe carried out both to identify existing hazards and 
continuous improvement. It appears that analysis is flexible and applicable to 
any equipment or system of interest at any stage of the lifecycle (Maguire 
2006).   
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2.2.2 Part II 
The HRA presented in Part II may be qualitative or quantitative and all of them are 
considered to be relevant for all the 5 challenges. Many of the identified HRA techniques 
from the literature study are for nuclear industry and there is no clear signal to transfer their 
applicability to wind farm industry. But it is strongly believed that some of them could be 
applicable for risk assessment within offshore wind farm industry. 
Many HRA methods are available and it has become obvious that some of them have been 
developed and used in risk assessment. A few of them are chosen and rewritten from 
(Holroyd 2009) to demonstrate their origins, brief description of the tools, pros and cons and 
their possible applicability in other domains. Although they are mainly designed for nuclear 
industry, they may be applicable as well to other sectors. It is also believed that a few 
methods of HRA could be transferred to risk assessment in offshore wind farm. Some of the 
techniques are publicly available, but it is still challenging to find out how they may be 
applied in other industries, for example, in wind farm industry.  
Table 2 HEA considered appropriate for safety challenges in offshore wind farm 
    Challenges 
 
 
Risk 
analysis 
techniques 
Falling 
objects 
during lifting 
operations 
Ship 
collisions 
within the 
wind farm 
Man 
overboard 
related to 
access to, 
and egress 
from wind 
turbines 
Occupational 
accidents 
related to 
working at 
height 
Challenges 
related to 
emergency 
handling 
1. THERP X X X X X 
Description “Technique for Human Error Rate Prediction (THERP) was developed by 
Swain and Guttman (1983) and it was prepared for the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. The theory presents methods, models and 
estimated human error probabilities (HEPs) to enable qualified analysis to 
make quantitative or qualitative assessment of occurrences of human errors 
in nuclear power plants (NPPs). THERP is a total methodology for assessing 
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human reliability that deals with task analyses, error identification and 
representation, as well as the quantification of HEPs. THERP is often referred 
to as a ‘decomposition’ approach in that its descriptions of task have a 
higher degree of resolution than many other techniques. It is also a logical 
approach and one that puts a larger degree of emphasis on error recovery 
than most other techniques. Essentially, the THERP handbook presents 
tabled entries of HEPs that can be modified by the effects of plant specific 
Performance Shaping Factors (PSFs), using other tables. THERP was 
designed for nuclear industry application but is a generic tool that can be 
applied in other sectors (Holroyd 2009).” 
 
Pros and cons (Kirwin 1994): 
“Pros: 
• THERP is well used in practice 
• It has a powerful methodology that can be audited 
• It is founded on a database of information that is included in the 
THERP handbook. 
Cons: 
• THERP can be resource intensive and time consuming. 
• It does not offer enough guidance on modeling scenarios and the 
impact of PSFs on performance. 
• The level of detail that is included in THERP may be excessive for 
many assessments.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
2. HEART X X X X X 
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Description “Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) is designed to 
be a quick and simple method for quantifying the risk of human error. It is a 
general method that is applicable to any situation or industry where human 
reliability is important.  
The HEART assessment can shed light on the key points of task vulnerability 
and suggest areas for improvement. The method includes error reduction 
strategies or remedial measures linked to the error producing conditions 
(Holroyd 2009). 
 
The method is based on a number of premises. 
1. Basic human reliability is dependent upon the generic nature of the 
task to be performed. 
2. In ‘perfect’ conditions, this level of reliability will tend to be achieved 
consistently with a given nominal likelihood within probabilistic 
limits. 
3. Given that these perfect conditions do not exist in all circumstances, 
the human reliability predicted may degrade as a function of the 
extent to which identified Error Producing Conditions (EPCs) might 
apply. 
 
There are 9 Generic Task Types (GTTs) described in HEART, each with an 
associated nominal human error potential (HEP), and 38 Error Producing 
Conditions (EPCs) that may affect task reliability, each with a maximum 
amount by which the nominal HEP can be multiplied. The key elements of 
the HEART method are: Classify the task for analysis into one of the 9 
Generic Task Types and assign the nominal HEP to the task. Decide which 
EPCs may affect task reliability and then consider the assessed proportion of 
affect (APOA) for each EPC. Then calculate the task HEP (Holroyd 2009).” 
 
An example HEART calculation is as the following which is taken from (Mohr 
1994) : 
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GTT classified as Task F (restore or shift a system to original or new state 
following procedures, with some checking). 
Nominal HEP = 0.003 (5th & 95th percentile bounds 00008-0.009) 
EPCs 
Total HEART 
Affect  APOA Assessed Affect 
Inexperience x 3 0.4 
(3-1) x 0.4 + 1 = 
1.8 
Opposite 
Technique x 6 1 
(6-1) X 1.0 + 1 = 
6.0 
Risk 
Misperception x 4 0.8 
(4-1) X 0.8 + 1 = 
3.4 
 
Assessed nominal likelihood of failure 
0.003 x 1.8 x 6 x 3.4 = 0.11 
Similar calculations may be performed to calculate the predicted 5th and 
95th percentile bounds, which in this case would be 0.07 – 0.58. 
HEART has been extensively used in the UK nuclear industry, and also in 
most other industries (chemical, aviation, rail, medical etc.). The underlying 
HEART model has subsequently been used to inform the development of 
some other tools in the area of HRA (Holroyd 2009). 
 
Pros and cons (Holroyd 2009): 
“Pros:  
• A versatile, quick and simple human-reliability-calculation 
method, which also gives the user (whether engineer or 
ergonomist) suggestions on error reduction.  
 
• Requires relatively limited resources to complete an 
assessment. 
 
Cons: 
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• Error dependency modeling is not included. 
• Requires greater clarity of description to assist users when 
discriminating between generic tasks and their associated 
EPCs; there is potential for two assessors to calculate very 
different HEPS for the same task.  
• Lack of information about the extent to which tasks should be 
decomposed for analysis.  
• Potential for double counting (some elements of EPCs are 
implicit in the task description)  
• Subjective nature of determining the assessed proportion of 
affects.” 
 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
3. CREAM X X X X X 
Description “CREAM was developed by Erik Hollnagel (1993) and the method is still 
under development. Hollnagel describes CREAM as fully bidirectional i.e. the 
same principles can be applied for retrospective analysis as well as 
performance prediction. The model is based on a fundamental distinction 
between competence and control. A classification scheme clearly separates 
genotypes (causes) and phenotypes (manifestations), and furthermore 
proposes a non-hierarchical organization of categories linked by means of 
the sub-categories called antecedents and consequents. 
This basic CREAM method can be used as a screening process to decide 
whether or not to continue with a HRA. The next stage of extended analysis 
requires a cognitive demands profile to be built. This involves describing 
each cognitive activity in terms of observation, interpretation, planning and 
execution (i.e. COCOM functions) and plotting this in graphical form. Based 
on the phenotype genotype classification, it is possible to create a complete 
list of cognitive function failures; however for practical purposes a subset of 
the list would be produced. For a defined subset each of the cognitive 
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functions (observation errors, interpretation errors, planning errors and 
execution errors) would have identifiable potential cognitive function 
failures, the distribution of which would once again be graphically 
represented and a Cognitive Failure Probability (CFP) would be calculated 
for each. Finally, a weighting factor is applied to the CFP scores depending 
on whether contextual influences (CPCs) are determined to be weak, 
medium or strong. 
 
Pros and cons (Holroyd 2009): 
Very few references were available that provided any level of critical review. 
The only comments that were identified are 10 years old and are as follows:  
In discussing Cognitive psychological approaches such as CREAM, Kirwan 
(1998) notes that “these approaches are potentially of most interest to 
psychologists and others who want to predict the more sophisticated error 
forms associated with misconceptions, misdiagnosis, etc. They attempt to 
explore the error forms arising from ‘higher-level’ cognitive behaviours”. 
Kirwan (1998) also states that, “more development is clearly needed in this 
category, and could be linked to cognitive task analysis approaches”. He 
also reports that the development of such approaches “…is limited, and new 
approaches are required, whether building on systems such as GEMS, or 
more novel hybrids such as the prototype CREAM technique which is still 
under development”. 
CREAM was developed for use in the nuclear industry, however the 
underlying method is generic and, therefore, it is suitable for use in other 
major hazard sectors.” 
  
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
4. ASEP X X X X X 
Description “ASEP was developed by Swain for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
P. ASEP comprises pre- accident screening with nominal human reliability 
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analysis, and post-accident screening and nominal human reliability analysis 
facilities. ASEP provides a shorter route to human reliability analysis than 
THERP by requiring less training to use the tool, less expertise for screening 
estimates, and less time to complete the analysis.” The four procedures that 
comprise the ASEP HRA procedure are described as follows:  
1. Pre-accident tasks: those tasks which, if performed incorrectly, could 
result in the unavailability of necessary systems or components in a 
complex plant such as a nuclear power plant (NPP) to respond 
appropriately to an accident.  
2. Post-accident tasks: those tasks, which are intended to assist the 
plant to cope successfully with an abnormal event that is to return 
the plant’s systems to a safe condition.  
3. Screening HRAs: Screening probabilities and response times are 
assigned to each human task as an initial type of sensitivity analysis. 
If a screening value does not have a material effect in the systems 
analysis, it may be dropped from further consideration. Screening 
reduces the amount of detailed analyses to be performed. HRAs at 
this stage deliberately use conservative estimates of HEPs, response 
times, dependence levels, and other human performance 
characteristics.  
4. Nominal HRAs: The regular probabilistic risk assessment carried out 
on tasks identified during the screening process. These use what the 
HRA team judges to be more realistic values, but still somewhat 
conservative (i.e. pessimistic) to allow for the team’s inability to 
consider all possible sources of error and all possible behavioral 
interactions.” 
 
Pros and cons (Holroyd 2009): 
“Very little information was identified about the relative pros and cons of 
ASEP. Kirwan (1994) noted that ASEP is quicker to carry out than THERP and 
can be computerized. It tends to be used as a screening approach to identify 
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those tasks that require a more detailed analysis using THERP. ASEP is a 
nuclear specific tool and, therefore, not suitable for other major hazard 
sectors.” 
 
 Falling objects Ship collisions Man 
overboard 
Working at 
height 
Emergency 
handling 
5. SPAR-H X X X X X 
Description “SPAR-H was developed for the US Nuclear Research Commission, Office of 
Regulatory Research. The method was used in the development of nuclear 
power plan (NPP) models and, based on experience gained in field-testing, 
was updated in 1999 and re-named SPAR-H.  It was mentioned that SPAR-H 
does the following: 
• Decomposes probability into contributions from diagnosis failures 
and action failures;  
• Accounts for the context associated with human failure events (HFEs) 
by using performance shaping factors (PSFs), and dependency 
assignment to adjust a base-case HEP;  
• Uses pre-defined base-case HEPs and PSFs, together with guidance 
on how to assign the appropriate value of the PSF;  
• Employs a beta distribution for uncertainty analysis, which can mimic 
normal and log normal distributions, but it has the advantage that 
probabilities calculated with this approach range from 0 to 1; and  
• Uses designated worksheets to ensure analyst consistency.  
 
The SPAR-H method assigns human activity to one of two general task 
categories: action or diagnosis.  
• Action tasks – carrying out one or more activities indicated by 
diagnosis, operating rules or written procedures. For example, 
operating equipment, performing line-ups, starting pumps, 
conducting calibration or testing, carrying out actions in response to 
alarms, and other activities performed during the course of following 
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plant procedures or work orders. (Generic error rate of 0.001)  
• Diagnosis tasks – reliance on knowledge and experience to 
understand existing conditions, planning and prioritizing activities, 
and determining appropriate courses of action. (Generic error rate 
0.01) 
 
Eight PSFs were identified as being capable of influencing human 
performance and are accounted for in the SPAR-H quantification process. 
The potential beneficial influence, as well as the detrimental influence, of 
these factors is included in the method.  
PSFs are: 
• Available time 
• Stress and stressors 
• Experience and training 
• Complexity 
• Ergonomics (& Human Machine Interface) 
• Procedures 
• Fitness for duty 
• Work processes 
 
When developing the basic SPAR H model, only three of the eight PSFs are 
evaluated: time available, stress and stressors, and complexity. The 
remaining five PSFs are generally considered to be event, plant or personnel 
specific and would be evaluated when a plant specific model is being 
developed.  
A major component of the SPAR H method is the SPAR H worksheet, which 
simplifies the estimation procedure. The process for using the worksheet 
differs slightly, depending on whether the analyst is using the method to 
build SPAR models, perform event analysis, or perform a more detailed HRA 
analysis.” 
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Pros and Cons (Holroyd 2009): 
“Pros: 
• A simple underlying model makes SPAR-H relatively easy to use and 
results are traceable. 
• The eight PSFs included cover many situations where more detailed 
analysis is not required. 
• The THERP-like dependence model can be used to address both 
subtask and event sequence dependence. 
 
Cons : 
• The degree of resolution of the PSFs may be inadequate for detailed 
analysis.  
• No explicit guidance is provided for addressing a wider range of PSFs 
when needed, but analysts are encouraged to use more recent 
context developing methods if more detail is needed for their 
application, particularly as related to diagnosis errors.  
• Although the authors checked the SPAH-H underlying data for 
consistency with other methods, the basis for selection of final values 
was not always clear.  
• The method may not be appropriate where more realistic, detailed 
analysis of diagnosis errors is needed. 
 
SPAR-H is based on the Heart approach and uses data from CREAM, THERP 
and ASEP.” 
 
 The method is believed to be applicable to other sectors, but no evidence 
was found of being used except nuclear plan (Mohr 1994).” 
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2.3 The process of Human Reliability Analysis 
This section presents a process for Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) that should be followed 
with a few basic steps. These different steps in the HRA analysis are presented in this section 
and discussed how they fit together. This is an introduction for the case studies coming in 
the next chapter. All the steps presented in the section reflect in two case studies in sections 
3 and 4.  
Human reliability analysis is executed in a process which consists of four mainly different 
steps. Figure 3 illustrates how a HRA may be performed with a systematic approach. 
Appendix 3 illustrates a more comprehensive process of HRA and the inclusion of it in the 
bow-tie risk analysis model.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There may be different systems or steps designed to reduce probability of making errors. 
The first typical step needed to do may be a task analysis. The method may be similar to job 
safe analysis or procedure HAZOP.  Below are further explanations for every step of the HRA 
process in Figure 3. 
Task analysis (TA) 
Human error reduction   
(HER) 
Human error identification 
(HEI) 
Human error quantification 
(HEQ) 
Figure 3: The process of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) 
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2.3.1 Task analysis 
“In order to identify human error modes, we must first understand the tasks that are being 
carried out. If we do not fully understand the tasks that people will perform, and the manner 
in which they are to be carried out, we cannot comprehensively identify where errors may 
originate. The tasks are studied most effectively by a task analysis.” (Rausand 2011) 
Task analysis is an initial step which gives systematic method for describing an operation 
from where human error can be identified. The task analysis is presented in the beginning 
and further detail analysis is extended from it step by step when HRA is needed to perform. 
In task analysis methods, the first three steps: 
1. Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
2. Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD) 
3. Tabular Task Analysis (TTA) 
The starting point is the HTA from the first step above and goes into the next OSD and TTA 
into more and more detail level. 
2.3.1.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
Hierarchical task analysis is part of the steps of Human Error Analysis (HEA) and is widely 
used in human reliability analysis. This is the first step of HEA. The application can be applied 
in all types of areas. It has been successfully applied in process control, military applications, 
aviation, power generation, and so on (Rausand 2011).  
(Rausand 2011) also states its advantages and limitations as follows:  
“Advantages of HTA: 
- Well documented and the most commonly used task analysis method. 
- Easy to learn, easy to implement, and requires minimal training. 
- Generic and can be applied to a variety of tasks. 
- Flexible such that tasks can be analyzed to any required level of detail. 
Limitations of HTA: 
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- Is descriptive rather than analytical. 
- Can be time-consuming for complex and large tasks. 
- Does not easily provide any scenario description. 
- Provides little information regarding collaboration. 
- Does not identify the participants involved in the task and the roles they play.” 
2.3.1.2 Operation Sequence Diagram (OSD) 
Related work tasks can be described in the operational Sequence Diagram sequentially. This 
is the next step in the task analysis which is further developed, and different actors could be 
involved.  This OSD shows how the different actors are interrelated between each other 
during an operation.  
2.3.1.3 Tabular Task Analysis (TTA) 
Tabular Task Analysis is the next step where it is necessary to go even more detail in 
analyzing each step which has been identified in OSD. Each action performed by different 
actors has become an input for further investigation. In tabular task analysis cues and 
feedbacks are the main concern. By applying cues and feedbacks, it becomes obvious how 
the task is flowing step by step in connection with the actors involved in the work sequence. 
When a feedback for each task is performed, it is possible to identify if something go wrong: 
in other words, in case of an ongoing failure, it can be identified before it is too late as the 
feedback is performed on that particular task.  In addition, possible errors can be identified 
by including extra colon in the table if it is needed.  
“Two main concepts of a TTA, according to (Rausand 2011), are: 
- “Cues. The cues indicate to the operator that an action can/should be initiated. (What 
is the next thing I should do?) 
- Feedback. The feedback informs the operator about the effects of carrying out the 
action. (What was the last thing I did?)” 
The application is used inn all type of areas and has been shown to be useful in the following 
contexts (Rausand 2011):  
- “Design or evaluation of human-machine interfaces. 
- Preparation for, or as part of a detailed HRA. 
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- Preparation of operational procedures. 
Advantages of TTA: 
- Is a flexible technique that allows any factor associated with the task to be analyzed. 
- Has the potential to provide a very comprehensive analysis of a particular task. 
- Is entirely generic and can be used in any domain. 
- Provides a much more detailed description of tasks than HTA. 
- Is potentially very exhaustive if the correct categories are used. 
Limitations of TTA: 
- May be a very time-consuming technique to apply. 
- Requires information that is often not available to the study team.” 
 
2.3.2 Human error identification (HEI) 
After the three steps in a task analysis, check lists can be performed for each task which has 
been simply identified in every action. However it could be hard to identify all possible 
human errors. Swain and Guttmann (1983) state; “To identify all possible errors is usually 
impossible. Even the best analyst cannot identify all possible modes of human response. No 
one can predict unlikely extraneous acts by plant personnel. Still, given sufficient time, a 
skilled analyst can identify most of the important tasks to be performed in a system and most 
of the ways in which errors are likely to be committed.”  
(Rausand 2011) also states: it is necessary to use one or more structured approaches to be 
able to identify as many of the critical human error modes as possible. 
In order to identify human errors a method of Action Error Mode Analysis (AEMA) worksheet 
can be used.  This method is applied to systematically identify any possible way of making 
human error including the consequences from making those errors.   
The next thing after the check list of AEMA is summing up for possible human errors in a 
tabular form. These possible human errors are needed for the inputs in further risk analysis 
in form of qualitative and quantitative screening. Possible human error may also be directly 
identified tabularly without following all the above steps, but their occurrences and 
consequences cannot be visualized in more detail as it is seen in the AEMA work sheet. 
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2.3.3 Human error quantification (HEQ) 
HEQ is a technique to estimate the human errors which is also illustrated in HRA process. 
Some of the techniques are illustrated in Table 2 and are proposed to be relevant risk 
analysis techniques for the safety challenges. Many human reliability analysis techniques are 
available now and SPARE-H is chosen to be tested in section 4.  
2.3.4 Human error reduction (HER) 
There are no separate HER methods found in the literature to reduce human errors.  
Although a HRA method is performed quantitatively, risk reduction may still be proposed 
qualitatively. In addition, necessary adjustment in the HEQ tool may be performed in order 
to reduce risk, for example, the SPAR-H method is tested at a later part of the report and risk 
reducing measure can be traced by making some adjustment in the method itself.  
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3 Case study I  
Access and egress would be considered to be taken into account in the following case 
analysis study. Ship collision between the access vessel and the wind turbine would also be 
part of the study. Human factors would be the main focus. Other factors which might appear 
during this operation are not taken into account, for example, adverse weather condition, 
thruster failure, and signal loss from Satellites to keep the vessel in position and so on. 
As it has been described previously in the process of HRA, a case study could be executed 
system by system. Firstly, a task analysis would be performed to provide the operation 
picture for access and egress.  The task analysis would then provide a source where possible 
human errors can be considered to retrieve systematically. Then secondly, a suitable HEI 
method would be used to identify possible human errors and their possible consequences.  
This case study 1 provides only half of HRA process, the rest of it will be continued in section 
4. 
3.1 Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
HTA is the first step applied in the task analysis to provide the operation picture for access 
and egress. Figure 4 shows how the task is considered when access and egress is required. 
The task is broken down in four levels where I initially start in plan 1 by checking weather 
condition and end up with the walk-way connection in plan 4. 
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Access and egress 
1. Ensure the 
current weather 
condition is good 
1. Check weather 
condition 
4. Keep vessel in 
position 
2. Commence 
vessel 
2. Ensure the 
predicted weather 
condition is observed 
5. Set up walk-
way 
6. Start personnel 
transfer 
3. Check local weather 
condition 
1. Check stability 
of current & wind  
3. Team leader 
decision to access or 
cancel 
2. Ensure risk is 
acceptable level 
1. Launch 
Ampelmann to the 
wind turbine 
2. Hook the walk-
way to the wind 
turbine 
3. Ensure the walk-
way is properly 
connected 
Plan 2 
Plan 3 
Plan 4 
Plan 1 
Cancel access if risk level is unacceptable. Otherwise, proceed. 
Figure 4: Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA) 
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3.1.1 Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD) 
The diagram is based on the previous HTA but only part the whole task which may be 
depicted from step 4 and 5 in plan 1 and all the steps in plan 4. Figure 5 shows the OSD for 
access to the wind turbine. In OSD, It is assumed that access or egress is carried out by using 
OTS (Offshore transfer system) or Amplemann between vessel and wind turbine. 
Communication has to take place among the vessel operator, machine operator (Walk-way 
machine operator) and team leader (or personnel). The operation must be carried out in the 
correct sequence in order to perform safe access to the installation. This is a sequential 
description during the operation of access and egress. According to the task performed in 
this case, 4 different actors are identified. They are forming different parts of the work tasks 
and are also working together to perform this specific operation.  
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Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD) for access to the wind turbine 
 
Actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working 
personnel 
Ampelman 
operator 
Vessel 
operator 
Walkie talkie 
Machine operator launches 
walk-way and asks if walk-
way is hooked 
Vessel operator 
tells they are 
ready 
Walkie talkie 
transmit 
message 
Walkie talkie 
Transmit 
message 
Personnel 
transfer begins 
Team leader or 
working 
personnel  
Team leader 
confirms walk-
way is hooked 
or engaged 
Walkie talkie 
Transmit 
message 
Machine operator initiates 
walk-way traffic light 
Communication 
Time 
Figure 5: Operational Sequence Diagram (OSD) 
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3.1.2 Tabular Task Analysis (TTA) 
Tabular Task Analysis is the next step where it is necessary to go even more detail in 
analyzing each step which has been identified in OSD. Each action performed by different 
actors has become an input for further investigation. In tabular task analysis cues and 
feedbacks are the main concern. By applying cues and feedbacks, it becomes obvious how 
the task is flowing step by step according to the actors involved in the work sequence. When 
a feedback for each task is performed, it is possible to identify if something go wrong: in 
other words, in case of an ongoing failure, it can be identified before it is too late as the 
feedback is performed on that particular task.  In addition, possible errors can be identified 
by including one more colon in the table if it is needed. Table 3 shows the identified cues and 
feedbacks which may occur when access to the wind turbine is required. 
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Table 3: Tabular Task Analysis 
No. Action 
(Description) 
Cues Feedback Possible errors Comments 
1   The vessel 
operator 
approaches the 
wind turbine 
The vessel 
operator 
positioned the 
vessel 
Observe the 
vessel is being 
stationary, e.g. 
visual or GPS 
on the 
operating 
screen on the 
vessel 
 
1.The vessel is 
unstable or 
moving, e.g. due 
wrong 
maneuvering 
and directional 
control 
2. Too close or 
too far 
Weather 
condition such as 
wind and current 
direction are 
considered to 
have been 
observed before 
this operation 
2   The vessel 
operator informs 
that the vessel is 
ready  
Message given 
to the 
Ampelmann 
operator 
Confirmation 
of receiving 
message given 
back to the 
vessel 
operator 
Communication 
error 
The vessel 
operator will 
require 
confirmation 
from the 
Ampelmann 
operator  
3   Machine operator 
launches the walk-
way after he was 
informed that the 
vessel is in 
position. 
Request if the 
walk-way is 
properly 
engaged to the 
wind turbine 
Receive 
confirmation 
that the walk-
way is hooked 
The walk-way is 
not connected 
properly to the 
wind turbine. 
(Hook wrongly) 
Communication. 
Visual check 
Double 
confirmation 
4   Team leader 
observes if the 
walk-way is 
engaged and 
informs the 
machine operator 
Tell the 
machine 
operator 
(Ampelmann)   
Check that 
machine 
operator 
receives the 
message 
Communication 
error e.g.  due to 
environmental 
stress 
Give visual signal 
in addition to 
verbal 
communication 
 
5   
Start personnel 
transfer 
Initiate the 
green light for 
personnel 
Observe that 
the green light 
is on 
Walk on the 
gang way too 
soon before it is 
Personnel 
transfer may be 
only one at a 
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transfer ready time to reduce 
risk in case of 
mechanical 
failure or sudden 
change of 
weather 
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3.1.3 Human Error Identification 
All possible human errors related to a particulate task within access and egress are 
considered and systematically identified. The worksheet in Figure 6 describes how human 
errors are systematically identified with their possible consequences which may result.  The 
next summary Table 4 further extends the level of risk and risk reducing measures for each 
identified error. Only one worksheet and a summary table are presented here to 
demonstrate how it is performed. The rest of all the other worksheets within this operation 
are attached in the Appendix 1.  
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Ref: 
1 
Action  
The vessel operator approaches the wind 
turbine 
Cue 
The vessel operator positioned 
the vessel 
Feedback 
Observe the vessel is being 
stationary 
Comments 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
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W
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G 
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W
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N
G 
O
BJ
EC
T 
W
RO
N
G 
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TI
O
N
 
LATENT FAILURE STATES 
1. Technical error in the vessel 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
  COMMENTS 
Yes                        No 
a. Technical error in the 
vessel 
b. Omits to give 
warning to the 
vessel operator that 
something is wrong 
Vessel operator lose 
control of the vessel Machine operator 
receives warning in 
time 
Hit the wind turbine 
Yes                        No 
c. Move the vessel 
too fast 
Vessel operator does 
not identify the correct 
moving speed to the 
wind turbine 
Hit the wind turbine 
d. Move the vessel 
too slow 
Operation delay 
Hit the wind turbine 
e. Position the vessel in 
the wrong angle 
Vessel keeps moving 
towards the wind turbine in 
the wrong direction 
Operation delay 
Figure 6: Action Error Mode Analysis work sheet (AEMA) 
39 
 
Table 4: Human Error Mode Analysis (AEMA) worksheet 
 
No. Action (Description) Action error 
mode 
Action error cause Action error 
consequences 
Risk Risk reducing 
measure 
Comments 
1. The vessel operator 
approaches the wind 
turbine 
- Wrong 
maneuvering  
- Move too 
fast 
- Procedure error 
- Slip 
Collision with 
the wind 
turbine 
H Adequate 
training 
 
1. Keep the vessel into 
position for access 
Move away 
from the right 
position (The 
vessel may be 
too far or too 
close) 
- Procedure error 
- Communication 
error 
- Slip 
- Lapse 
May lead to 
material loss 
or/and injuries 
to working 
personnel  
H Adequate 
training to the 
vessel operator 
 
2.  The vessel operator 
informs that the vessel 
is ready 
The vessel is 
positioned but 
the dynamic 
positioning 
system has 
not been 
activated. Or 
the current 
and the wind 
direction were 
not 
considered for 
the right 
position of the 
vessel. 
- Procedure error 
- Mistake 
- Slip 
May lead to 
material loss 
or/and injuries 
to working 
personnel 
 
H Having a simple 
working 
procedure / 
Adequate 
training to the 
vessel operator 
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3.  Machine operator 
launches the walk-way 
after he was informed 
that the vessel is in 
position 
Hit the wind 
turbine 
- Procedure error 
- Mistake 
- Slip 
May lead to 
material loss 
or/and injuries 
to working 
personnel 
 
H Adequate 
training to the 
vessel operator 
 
4.  Hook the walk-way to 
the wind turbine for 
access 
Not properly 
hook to the 
wind turbine 
- Procedure error 
- Communication 
error   
- Slip 
- Lapse 
Walking 
personnel may 
fall  
M Visual check 
should be 
carried out if 
the walk-way is 
engaged 
properly before 
personnel 
transfer 
 
5. Initiate personnel 
transfer 
1. Give green 
light signal too 
early  
2. Disengage 
the walk-way 
too early 
- Procedure error 
- Communication 
error 
- Slip 
Walking 
personnel may 
fall 
M Machine 
operator 
observes the 
transfer process 
visually 
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4 Case study 2 
This study presents a HRA method by using the SPAR-H worksheet for estimating the human 
error probabilities which may occur during access and egress. This method is assumed to be 
an adequate HRA tool in performing risk analyses for this challenge. In this study only 
possible human errors are included when testing SPAR-H model. Other contributing factors 
are neglected in the analysis. And the analysis is performed according to the steps and 
procedures in the report by (D. Gertman 2004). 
The SPAR-H method is tested here and its worksheet provides a pre-defined base-case HEPs 
where detail information is unavailable when assigning the appropriate values of the PSF 
levels. Therefor the analysis is performed with a lot of assumptions. Based on some 
reasonable information which can be considered most relevant to access and egress, 
assumptions are made to fill out the HRA worksheet. If this HRA worksheet is applied in a 
practical situation, without having too many assumptions made, where detailed information 
about each PSF level is available, then it can be assumed that the more accurate HEP, which 
is closer to the reality, will be achieved from the calculation.  
After finishing the worksheet a more detailed analysis of ETA is also presented as part of this 
section. The ETA consists of the evaluated human errors which have been modified on the 
worksheets. The ETA model used to evaluate this case includes both action and diagnosis (or 
a combination of both) depending on the tasks found in the event sequence.  Different 
possible human errors and reasonable situations are considered for filling out PSF levels in 
the worksheet to go through a thorough investigation of how the SPAR-H model works for 
this challenge. All the calculated HEPs are included in the section and in Appendix 2 for 
detailed analysis. 
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4.1 Case study analysis for approaching the wind turbine for access and 
egress 
The following case analysis is related to a vessel approach to a wind turbine when access is 
required. The event is assumed to be loss of control of the vessel due to malfunction of the 
system and human errors.  A number of human errors are identified within this operation. 
These include failing to: diagnose system failure in the vessel, perform a correct action when 
manual operation is needed to control the vessel, control the vessel in time, etc.   
To make a possible case, some assumptions considered to be most relevant are first made as 
follows: 
• The weather condition is predicted and reasonably fine for access and egress. 
• The local weather condition is also good when the vessel is out there. 
• Approaching the wind farm is considered to be critical, therefor the vessel is 
equipped with GPS to detect speed and distance, alarm system when the vessel is 
too close and dynamic braking system (system to reverse propeller for backward 
motion). Unfortunately these are malfunctioning and do not provide the correct 
information indicating that the vessel operator can proceed further operation. But in 
fact, the vessel operator has to control the vessel manually now.  
• Human error probabilities which apply in this case: (1) probability of vessel operator 
failing to diagnose the system failures in the vessel, (2) probability of operator failing 
to detect the speed and distance, (3) probability of operator failing to take correct 
action after being detected the system failure and (4) probability of failure that 
operator cannot control the vessel in time which can result collision. 
• If the crew has no available time to respond in any of the above 4 incidents, then 
there is no doubt that the probability of colliding the vessel with the wind turbine is 
too high. Each time a human error occurs in the above case, it is assumed that there 
is enough time to respond. For example, even if the dynamic braking system of the 
vessel fails, it is still considered that the operator has enough time to recover the 
situation to void collision.  
• The distance is about 100-200 meters. 
• If the vessel speed is too high, it will lose control; in the worst case collision will 
occur. 
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Here, the basic event is assumed to be the operator’s failure to detect the vessel system 
failure while approaching the wind turbine at a considerable speed. This is the first task 
selected to perform in the SPAR-H worksheet without formal dependence. The basic event 
involves only a diagnosis.  
 
Figure 7: SPAR-H worksheet for a diagnosis error to identify system failure 
Only 2 negative PSF influences are present according to the above evaluation so that the 
final diagnosis HEP is accepted without needing to make an adjustment factor. So it is 
possible to say that the probability of being unable for the operator to detect the system 
failure is 9 %.  
If, for example, the available time to diagnose the system failure is assumed to be barely an 
adequate time, then the HEP increases up to 50 %. On the other hand, if the procedure is 
changed to be nominal in this case assuming that the procedure is available on the vessel 
which enables to detect system failure, and then the HEP decreases to 20 %.  The PSF for the 
procedure is set up as “available, but poor”, but in the real situation a procedure may not 
necessarily be available to identify such system failure. And if this is the case, the HEP 
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increases up to 100 % which seems really unreasonable. The calculation of the SPAR-H 
worksheet shows that a single contributing factor can play a significant role for the final HEP. 
The difference between the normal weather and the bad weather condition or dependency 
factors also show a significant change of the final result. 
If considering a second possible human failure in the event sequence, it can be that the 
system failure has been detected but the operator fails to perform correct action to control 
the vessel.  
 
Figure 8: SPAR-H worksheet for an action error to perform correct action 
The above is no longer a diagnosis analysis, but action. The worksheet calculation shows that 
action analysis gives usually lower HEP when comparing to diagnosis analysis. Here, the 
calculated HEP is only 1,5 %, if this is in case diagnosis analysis it turns up to be  9 % which 
obviously means that the chance of human failure to diagnosis is higher than to take action. 
As the previous example, only two negative influencing factors are found that no adjustment 
is applied according to the worksheet procedure. But dependency factors now are included 
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here which finally results that the human error probability to take correct action is around 
16 %.  
The final possible event considered in this sequence is that the operator fails to control the 
speed in time to avoid collision which may happen after the system failure has been 
detected and correct action has been performed. Here, the dynamic position system is 
assumed to be functioning, but this may not play an important role to control the vessel.  
 
Figure 9: SPAR-H worksheet for an action error to control the vessel's speed in time 
No adjustment factor applied due to only two negative influencing factor as the previous 
two evaluation and the final action HEP is 17, 5 %.  
Not any of the above evaluations is a combination of diagnosis and action HEP. Each of them 
is separately analyzed in the worksheet, but at a later part of this section more evaluation 
involving both diagnosis and action HEP is discussed.  
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The following ETA is presented to perform a more detailed analysis. The intention is to find 
out the probabilities of possible collision between vessel and wind turbine due to human 
errors. All the HEPs from the calculation of the SPAR-H worksheet above are applied in the 
model.  
The logical sequence of the operation can be described as below. Possible technical failures 
are not considered in the analysis of this report. 
 
Fails to diagnose 
the vessel system 
failure 
Fails to perform a 
correct action to 
control the vessel 
Fails to control 
the speed in time 
 
Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
 
Figure 10: HRA event tree structure for a detailed analysis of collision between vessel and wind 
turbine 
 
  
Yes (0,099) 
Yes (0,175) 
Yes (0,175) 
No (0,825) 
No (0,825) 
Possible collision 
(0,003) 
Possible collision 
(0,013) 
Possible collision 
(0,015) 
Possible collision 
(0,069) 
Possible collision 
(0,025) 
Possible collision 
(0,116) 
Possible collision 
(0,133) 
 No collision (0,627) 
No (0, 844) 
Yes (0,156) 
Yes (0,175) 
Yes (0,175) 
No (0, 901) 
No (0,825) 
Yes (0,156) 
No (0, 844) 
No (0,825) 
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4.2 Case study analysis for personnel transfer from the vessel to the wind 
turbine 
The following case study analysis is also a SPAR-H application followed by the ETA model as 
it was done in the previous analysis. The operation includes positioning the vessel near the 
wind turbine, launching the walk-way (OTS or Amplemann) to wind turbine, engaging the 
walk-way to the landing station built on the wind turbine, and transferring personnel to the 
installation. Three different actors now involve in the analysis. 
The first one is the SPAR-H worksheet analysis for the task of getting ready for access after 
the vessel is being positioned near the wind turbine. The potential error modeled is giving 
message too early by the vessel operator to the machine operator. The vessel has 
approached the wind turbine; the operator activates the DPS and then gives message to the 
machine operator that access can now be initiated.  
 
Figure 11: SPAR-H worksheet for an action error to deliver message too soon before the vessel is 
ready 
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The second one is an analysis for the task of launching the walk-way by the machine 
operator to the wind turbine. The activity takes place after the vessel has been properly 
positioned. The machine operator launches the walk-way and engages it to the landing 
station on the wind turbine. The potential error modeled is failing to properly engage the 
walk-way to the landing station on the turbine. This is considered that both action and 
diagnosis are included in this mode.  
Part 1, evaluate each PSF for diagnosis 
Evaluate PSFs for the diagnosis portion of the task 
 
Figure 12: SPAR-H worksheet for improper engagement of the walk-way (diagnosis portion) 
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Part 2, evaluate each PSF for action 
Evaluate PSFs for the action portion of the task 
 
Figure 13: SPAR-H worksheet for improper engagement of the walk-way (action portion) 
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The third one is the SPAR-H worksheet analysis for the working personnel crossing the walk-
way before the machine is ready. This activity should only take place after the walk-way is 
engaged properly to the installation.  
 
Figure 14: SPAR-H worksheet for an action error to cross the walk-way 
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The logical sequence of the operation can be described as below. 
Deliver 
message 
before vessel 
ready 
Fail to 
properly 
engage the 
walk-way 
(Diagnosis) 
Fail to 
properly 
engage the 
walk-way 
(Action) 
Cross the 
walk-way 
before ready 
Probability of 
hazardous 
event (e.g. 
personnel 
injured or fall) 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                   
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Only possible human errors are considered in the ETA analysis. 
Figure 15: HRA event tress structure for a detailed analysis of personnel transfer to wind turbine 
Yes (0,015) 
Yes (0,922) 
Yes (0,078) 
No (0,922) 
Possible accident (1, 43E-
 
No (0, 760) 
Yes (0,240) 
Yes (0,078) 
Yes (0,078) 
No (0, 901) 
Yes (0,240) 
No (0, 760) 
No (0,922) 
Yes (0,078) 
Yes (0,922) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
Yes (0,051) 
No (0,949) 
No (0,949) 
No (0,949) 
No (0,949) 
No (0,949) 
No (0,949) 
No (0949) 
No (0,949) 
Possible accident (0, 00017) 
Possible accident (0, 0032) 
Possible accident (4, 54E-05) 
Possible accident (0, 00027) 
Possible accident (0, 20685) 
Possible accident (0, 01111) 
Possible accident (0, 01750) 
Possible accident (0, 00094) 
Possible accident (0, 01000) 
Possible accident (0, 00054) 
Possible accident (0, 00084) 
No accident (0, 65500) 
Possible accident (0, 03520) 
Possible accident (0, 05541) 
Possible accident (0, 00298) 
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5 Risk reducing measures for HEP and Recommendation 
The SPAR-H method produces a simple estimation of HEP for risk models. The eight PSFs 
contained in its work-sheet have interrelationship which effect on the estimated HEP. By 
focusing on each PSF, possible risk reducing measures can be proposed.  
1. Time is the most influencing factor that plays important role when it is needed to 
reduce risk. In every task performed on the case studies, it shows that the estimation 
of HEP can be reduced considerably by having more available time.  For example, in 
case study analysis 1, it was assumed that a system failure had to be identified in 
order that the probability of the vessel collision would be reduced. The time applied 
in the worksheet is nominal which results the calculated HEP with 0.0999. When 
changing the time available from nominal to expensive time, the calculated HEP 
reduces from 0,0999 to 0,000999. If a failure exists in the system of the vessel, it 
should be identified as early as possible before the vessel is out there on the sea for 
access or egress. Regular maintenance both for the vessel and the access machine 
should be performed.  It could be too late to avoid unwanted event if system or 
equipment failures are identified when they are required. 
Time-press should be avoided. If possible, there should always be more available 
time for the operator or working personnel to carry out every action. In the event 
where it is assumed that the operator fails to perform a correct action, it is assigned 
as nominal, but when the time available increases to an extra amount of time the 
reduction results from 0,156 to 0,143. In the event where it is assumed that the 
operator fails to control the speed in time is assigned to be approximately available 
(not too much) this results the HEP with 0,175, but if the time available increases to 
an extra amount of time, the estimated HEP ends up with 0,143. 
When the three reduction values above are further assigned in the following ETA, it 
results that the probability of no collision between the vessel and the turbine has 
increased to 0,734 which was earlier 0,627. 
 
2. Environmental factors such as strong wind, heavy current, mist or rain should be 
avoided if possible because these can affect the operator’s mental or physical 
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performance. These factors can increase stress which is one of PSFs in the SPAR-H 
worksheet.  
3. All the tasks should be made clear before they are executed, if possible, they should 
be performed by only those who have skill.  
4. Proper training and sufficient information should be provided to the people involved.  
5. Communication is also vital part in the operation; therefor clear communication 
should be in place during access and egress. Simple procedures should be established 
regarding the communication for the work tasks between the vessel operator, 
machine operator and the team leader. This may reduce the possibility of 
communication errors. An example may be to require verification of critical messages 
where the receiver repeats the message.  
6. Use the safest way for access or egress; for example, use OTS (Offshore Transfer 
System) instead of a direct helicopter landing, crane or rope transfers. It is claimed 
that over 7000 successful connections with 100,000 personnel transfers with no LTIs 
has been completed since early 2006  (B.V. 2011). 
7. Ensure that weather condition and the sea stage is good before entering the wind 
farm. 
8. Visual check should be carried out wherever it is necessary. For example, when the 
walk-way is engaged to the wind turbine, it should be ensured by visual check that it 
is properly connected before personnel transfer is initiated. 
9. All the involved people should work as a team and should be able communicate what 
is expected and what actually happens before and during access and egress, as well 
as providing feedback once the operation is complete 
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6 Summary and recommendation 
In this final chapter, I would sum up what it has been done in the report and which result I 
have got. I would also propose some suggestion for improvement. Advantages and 
disadvantages of the SPAR-H method found from the case studies would be covered as well. 
I would end my report by including recommendation for further work. 
6.1 Summary and conclusion 
The report begins by suggesting possible risk analysis methods which may be most relevant 
within the five challenges identified in the report by SINFEF, 2011. Different risk analysis 
techniques both quantitative and qualitative are proposed with focus on all the five 
challenges. The first part of the report suggests possible risk analysis methods which could 
be applicable for equipment and system failures, and the rest of the report mainly discusses 
risk analysis techniques related to human reliability analysis.  
Since the contribution of human erroneous action is usually higher than equipment and 
mechanical failures when accidents occur, human reliability analysis are prioritized and 
taken into account when considering risk assessment methods and applications. Therefor it 
was decided that the thesis work deals mostly with HRA. The process of HRA and SPAR-H 
could be considered as an important part of this report.  Among all the suggested risk 
analysis methods, SPAR-H method was chosen to put into a test in the report because the 
method is based on the HEART approach and uses data from CREAM, THERP and ASEP. It 
was therefore reasonable to believe that the SPAR-H method is the most appropriate 
method.  A predefine SPAR-H worksheet was used for the explicit documentation of PSFs, 
and calculation of adjusted HEPs. The worksheet was provided by my supervisor and is 
discussed in (MARINA 2012) where some proposed modification to the nominal HEPs are 
given.  
Off all the five challenges identified by SINTEF report, two of them are mainly discussed and 
taken into account in the two case studies: collision between vessel and wind turbine when 
approaching a wind turbine and access/egress when personnel transfer is required. In this 
scenario, an investigation from HRA point of view was performed explicitly in the two case 
studies and Appendix 2. Any possible human errors, potential hazardous events and the way 
how the hazardous event might happen are described in the case studies. HRA method is 
performed in a process by using different tools and techniques. The first part of the HRA 
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process is a systematic approach to identify all possible human errors which become 
preliminary assessment of data needed in a HEQ method in the final risk analysis. SPAR-H 
technique was applied for quantitative risk analysis. The procedures provided for SPAR-H 
technique is followed according to the report by (D. Gertman et al. 2004). ETA was followed 
after the SPAR-H techniques for more detailed analysis. Possible risk reducing measures for 
HEP are finally suggested.  
6.2 Result discussion 
In the section I would clarify if the objectives of the report in section 1 are met. There may 
be some uncertainty but all the questions defined in the thesis assignment are answered. All 
the objectives are placed in Table 5 with the answers achieved from the report. 
Table 5: Objectives and results of the report 
M
ai
n 
ob
je
ct
iv
es
 
1. Select three or more safety challenges 
based on earlier work by SINFEF report 
Yes. All the safety challenges are 
selected in a tabular form in section 2. 
2. Propose relevant risk analysis techniques 
for these challenges. 
Yes. All different risk analysis techniques 
are proposed for all the challenges in 
table 1 in section 2. 
3. Propose a complete set of risk analysis 
techniques to apply for each of these safety 
challenges. 
Yes. In this report, HRA is the main focus 
risk analysis technique. The process of 
HRA is presented. The limitation is that 
only two challenges are taken into 
account due to time limit. 
4. Demonstrate the techniques for the 
selected safety challenges which include 
preliminary assessment data such as human 
error probabilities, weather data, 
operational limits related to, e.g., wave 
height etc. 
The preliminary assessment data of 
Human error probabilities are achieved. 
But unfortunately, other data such as 
current, wave height, wind etc. are not 
taken into the report due to time limit 
during the report period. 
5. Propose risk reducing measures and 
procedures to reduce risk. 
 
Yes, risk reducing measures are 
proposed in section 5. 
Su
b 
-o
bj
ec
tiv
es
 
1 To get familiar with different methods or 
tools to systematically identify human 
erroneous actions. 
 
Yes. HTA, OSD, TTA and HEI are 
presented. 
2 To understand a HRA method or more as 
the main tool to apply for the selected 
Yes, SPAR-H method is used in this 
report. 
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challenges. 
3 To apply the methods on a case or more in 
order to get experience with the methods. 
 
Yes.  The SPAR-H method is applied on 
two cases: collision and access or egress. 
4 To investigate strengths and weaknesses of 
the HRA method. 
 
Yes. The pre-defined strengths and 
weaknesses the SPAR-H method is 
presented. In addition, more limitations 
and weaknesses are discussed according 
to the results of the two case studies.  
  
57 
 
6.3 Strengths and weaknesses of the SPAR-H method 
The pros and cons of the SPAR-H method are mentioned by Holroyd 2009 in Part II in section 
2, but these are presented again in order that comparison may be possible in some cases. 
Pros and Cons (Holroyd 2009): 
“Pros: 
• A simple underlying model makes SPAR-H relatively easy to use and results are 
traceable. 
• The eight PSFs included cover many situations where more detailed analysis is not 
required. 
• The THERP-like dependence model can be used to address both subtask and event 
sequence dependence. 
Cons : 
• The degree of resolution of the PSFs may be inadequate for detailed analysis.  
• No explicit guidance is provided for addressing a wider range of PSFs when needed, 
but analysts are encouraged to use more recent context developing methods if more 
detail is needed for their application, particularly as related to diagnosis errors.  
• Although the authors checked the SPAH-H underlying data for consistency with other 
methods, the basis for selection of final values was not always clear.  
• The method may not be appropriate where more realistic, detailed analysis of 
diagnosis errors is needed.” 
According to the two cases studies performed, a number of strengths and weaknesses can 
also be further listed. Some of them are the same as the above pros and cons, but more 
information are available from the following findings as well. 
Advantages: 
1. The SPAR-H method is a simplified approach which can be used either qualitative or 
quantitative screening analysis.  
2. Its work-sheet is easy to apply by just making relevant assumptions behind each PSF 
assignment which also reduces expert judgment as much as possible. 
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3. In the estimation of the HEP, the worksheet includes 8 PSFs which contribute 
negative effects on performance. For example, an estimated human error probability 
increases as a negative influence of a PSF grows. So the most contributing factors 
among the eight PSFs can be traceable. 
Weaknesses: 
1. The method itself does not mention the remedial measures. Remedial action has to 
be considered separately in the logic structure of fault tree models or event tree 
models. 
2. The method does not provide guidance on how to develop a probabilistic risk analysis 
(PRA). 
3. The gap between HEP with and without dependency factors is difficult to understand 
and not often traceable. 
6.4 Recommendations for further work 
SINFEF report has identified 5 challenges, but only two of the challenges are part of the 
report: collision between vessel and wind turbine and access or egress due to human errors. 
These two challenges are analyzed only from the HRA point of view. Other technical related 
risk analysis assessments, e.g. from the suggested techniques in table 1 in section 2, should 
also be performed. The other three challenges should also be taken into account for risk 
assessments by the suggested risk analysis techniques. 
Although SPAR-H method is easy to use, there is some confusion when it comes to 
dependency factors. One should find out more about how these factors are considered in 
the SPAR-H worksheet.  
Fault Tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis are often mentioned in relation to SPAR-H 
method, but the relationship between the two model and SPAR-H are not explained in the 
report by (D. Gertman 2004). Further efforts should be attempt in order to find out the 
relationship and how they fit together. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Ref: 
2 
Action  
The vessel operator informs that the vessel is 
ready 
Cue 
Message given to the Ampelmann 
operator 
Feedback 
Confirmation of receiving 
message given back to the 
vessel operator 
Comments 
The vessel operator will 
require confirmation from 
the Amplemann operator 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
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LATENT FAILURE STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
  COMMENTS 
Yes                        No 
Yes                        No 
a. Deliver message before 
the vessel is actually 
ready 
Start launching the 
Ampelmann too soon 
Engage the walkway to 
the wind turbine 
before the vessel is 
ready 
Yes                        No 
c. The walk-way is hooked 
to the wind turbine 
Disconnect the walk-way 
again in time 
Tension or block walkway 
between the vessel and the 
wind turbine 
Engage the walkway to the 
wind turbine before the 
vessel is ready 
Cause material loss which 
may also result severe 
accident to working 
personnel nearby 
Cause material loss 
which may also result 
severe accident to 
working personnel 
nearby 
b. Interrupt or give warning 
the Ampelmann operator  
Receive the interuption in 
time 
Cause material loss which 
may also result severe 
accident to working 
personnel nearby 
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Ref: 
3 
Action  
Machine operator launches the walk-way after 
he was informed that the vessel is in position. 
Cue 
Request if the walk-way is 
properly engaged to the wind 
turbine 
Feedback 
Receive confirmation that the 
walk-way is hooked 
Comments 
Communication between the 
Ampelmann and team leader 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
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ACTION 
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LATENT FAILURE STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
  COMMENTS 
Yes                        No 
a. Launch the walk-way 
before the vessel is ready 
or positioned stably 
b. Omit to stop the 
Ampelmann operator 
Tension or block the 
walkway between the 
vessel and wind turbine 
Stop the walk-way 
from being hooked to 
the wind turbine 
Hook the walk-way 
between the wind 
turbine and the vessel 
Yes                        No 
c. Engage the walk-
way in the wrong 
order 
Identify the wrong 
engagement 
Personnel fall from the 
walk-way during 
transfer  
d. Move the walk-
way too slow 
Operation delay 
Cause material loss which 
may also result severe 
accident to working 
personnel nearby 
Cause material loss 
which may also result 
severe accident to 
working personnel 
nearby 
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Ref: 
4 
Action  
Team leader observes if the walk-way is 
engaged 
Cue 
Tell the machine operator 
(Ampelmann)   
Feedback 
Check that machine operator 
receives the message 
Comments 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
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LATENT FAILURE STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
  COMMENTS 
b. Omit to confirm 
that the walk-way is 
engaged 
Machine operator does 
not get the message 
Operation delay 
Yes                        No 
c. Confirm that the 
walk way is hooked, 
but means ‘no’ 
Initiate personel 
transfer 
Stop personnel 
transfer 
a. Observe wrongly that 
the walk-way is hooked. 
Leave the walk-way 
engagement without 
being finished  
Personnel fall from the 
walk-way during 
transfer 
Personnel fall from the 
walk-way during 
transfer 
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Ref: 
5 
Action 
Start personnel transfer 
Cue 
Initiate the green light for 
personnel transfer 
Feedback 
Observe that the green light is 
on 
Command 
 
 
ASSUMPTIONS 
  
 
 
 
 
  
                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
INCORRECT 
ACTION 
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O
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LATENT FAILURE STATES 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUTIONS 
  COMMENTS 
Yes                        No 
a. Omits to initiate the 
green light 
b. Initiate the green 
light too soon 
Operation delay 
Personnel start walking 
on the walk-way 
Stop perosnnel 
transfer 
Yes                        No 
c. Walk across the gang-
way while the red light 
is on 
Stop personnel  
Violation the 
procedure which may 
result accident 
Personnel fall from the 
walk-way 
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Qualitative screening  
No Action Error ID Comments 
1 
 
The vessel operator approaches the wind turbine Move the vessel too fast MVF The vessel operator 
approaches the wind turbine 
not identifying the correct 
moving speed. Critical if this 
happens. 
Position the vessel in the 
wrong angle 
PVWA Critical if the wind or the 
current direction is strong 
2 The vessel operator informs that the vessel is ready Deliver message before the 
vessel is actually ready 
DMBVR  
3 Machine operator launches the walk-way after he was 
informed that the vessel is in position. 
Launch the walk-way before 
the vessel is ready 
LWBVR  
Omit to stop the 
Amplemann operator 
OTSAP  
Engage the walk-way in the 
wrong order (Not hooked) 
EWWO Critical if the walk-way is not 
hooked  
4 Team leader observes if the walk-way is engaged Observe wrongly that the 
walk-way is hooked 
OWWH Critical if this happens. 
Omit to confirm that the 
walk-way is engaged 
OCWE This can cause only 
operation delay 
Say that the walk way is 
hooked but means ‘No’ 
SWHBMN  
5 Start personnel transfer Omits to initiate the green 
light 
OIGL Not critical, but the 
operation will be just 
delayed. 
Initiate the green light too 
soon 
IGLTS  
Walk across the gang-way 
while the red light is on  
WAGWRL  
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Appendix 2 
 
1. The vessel operator position the vessel in the wrong angle against current or 
wind direction 
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68 
 
 
Wrong angle 
against current 
and wind 
Too late to detect 
wrong angle 
Fails to control 
the vessel  
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
  
Yes (0,03) 
Yes (0,168) 
Yes (0,168) 
No (0,832) 
No (0,832 
Fails to control the 
vessel (7, 4E-04)) 
Fails to control the 
vessel (3, 6E-03 
Fails to control the 
vessel (4, 3E-03) 
Fails to control the 
vessel (0,021) 
Fails to control the 
vessel (0,024) 
Fails to control the 
vessel (0,117) 
Fails to control the vessel 
(0,140) 
Control the vessel 
(0,689) 
No (0, 855) 
Yes (0,145) 
Yes (0,168) 
Yes (0,168) 
No (0, 970) 
No (0,832) 
Yes (0,145) 
No (0, 855) 
No (0,832 
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2. The vessel operator delivers message to machine operator before the vessel 
is ready 
 
  
70 
 
 
 
71 
 
Deliver message 
before the vessel 
is ready 
Launch the walk-
way before the 
vessel is ready 
Fails to interrupt 
the Amplemann 
operator  
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
  
Yes (0,015) 
Yes (0,341) 
Yes (0,341) 
No (0,659) 
No (0,659) 
Potential accident      
(8, 6E-04) 
Potential accident      
(1, 7E-03) 
Potential accident      
(4, 3E-03) 
Potential accident      
(8, 2E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0,057) 
Potential accident      
(0,110) 
Potential accident      
(0,279) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,540) 
No (0, 831) 
Yes (0,169) 
Yes (0,341) 
Yes (0,341) 
No (0, 985) 
No (0,659) 
Yes (0,169) 
No (0, 831) 
No (0,659) 
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3. The machine operator launches the walk-way before the vessel is properly 
being positioned 
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74 
 
Launch the walk-
way before the 
vessel is ready 
Fails to detect the 
wrong sequence 
operation 
Fails to interrupt 
the Amplemann 
operator  
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
Yes (0,030) 
Yes (0,064) 
Yes (0,064) 
No (0,936) 
No (0,936) 
Potential accident      
(3, 4E-04) 
Potential accident      
(4, 97 E-03) 
Potential accident      
(1, 59E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0, 0321) 
Potential accident      
(0,042) 
Potential accident      
(0,608) 
Potential accident      
(0,021) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,747) 
No (0, 823) 
Yes (0,177) 
Yes (0,064) 
Yes (0,064) 
No (0, 970) 
No (0,936) 
Yes (0,177) 
No (0, 823) 
No (0,936) 
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4. The machine operator has launches the walk-way too early and it is omitted 
to stop the wrong operation. 
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77 
 
Omit to stop the 
Amplemann 
operator 
Fails to stop the 
walk-way from 
being hooked 
Fails to cancel the 
walk-way 
engagement  
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
Yes (0,030) 
Yes (0,129) 
Yes (0,129) 
No (0,871) 
No (0,871) 
Potential accident      
(6, 5E-04) 
Potential accident      
(4, 4E-03) 
Potential accident      
(3, 2E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0,022) 
Potential accident      
(0,021) 
Potential accident      
(0,143) 
Potential accident      
(0,104) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,702) 
No (0, 831) 
Yes (0,169) 
Yes (0,129) 
Yes (0,129) 
No (0, 970) 
No (0,871) 
Yes (0,169) 
No (0, 831) 
No (0,871) 
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5. The machine operator engages the walk-way in the wrong order 
 
 
  
79 
 
 
 
80 
 
Engage the walk-
way in the wrong 
order 
Fails to identify 
the wrong 
engagement 
(wrong 
observation) 
Fails to stop 
personnel 
transfer with 
wrong 
engagement 
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
  
  
Yes (0,030) 
Yes (0,214) 
Yes (0,214) 
No (0,786) 
No (0,786) 
Potential accident      
(2, 0E-03) 
Potential accident      
(7, 4E-03) 
Potential accident      
(4, 4E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0,016) 
Potential accident      
(0,065) 
Potential accident      
(0,239) 
Potential accident      
(0,142) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,523) 
No (0, 686) 
Yes (0,314) 
Yes (0,214) 
Yes (0,214) 
No (0, 970) 
No (0,786) 
Yes (0,314) 
No (0, 686) 
No (0,786) 
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6. The team leader wrongly observes that the walk-way is engaged, but it is not 
hooked properly. 
 
  
82 
 
 
 
83 
 
Observe wrongly 
that the walk-way 
is hooked 
Fails to identify 
the wrong 
engagement 
(wrong 
observation) 
Fails to cancel 
personnel 
transfer with 
wrong 
engagement 
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
 
  
Yes (0,020) 
Yes (0,169) 
Yes (0,169) 
No (0,831) 
No (0,831) 
Potential accident      
(1, 1E-03) 
Potential accident      
(5, 2E-03) 
Potential accident      
(2, 3E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0, 011) 
Potential accident      
(0,052) 
Potential accident      
(0,256) 
Potential accident      
(0,114) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,559) 
No (0, 686) 
Yes (0,314) 
Yes (0,169) 
Yes (0,169) 
No (0, 98) 
No (0,831) 
Yes (0,314) 
No (0, 686) 
No (0,831) 
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7. The team leader says that the walk-way is hooked, he means ‘No’. 
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86 
 
Say that the walk-
way is hooked but 
means ‘No’ 
Fails to stop the 
Amplemann 
operator from 
initiating 
personnel 
transfer (Green 
light) 
Fails to cancel 
personnel 
transfer with 
wrong 
engagement 
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
  
Yes (0,030) 
Yes (0,214) 
Yes (0,214) 
No (0,786) 
No (0,786) 
Potential accident      
(1, 1E-03) 
Potential accident      
(4, 0E-03) 
Potential accident      
(5, 3E-03) 
Potential accident      
(0, 0196) 
Potential accident      
(0,035) 
Potential accident      
(0,129) 
Potential accident      
(0,173) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,634) 
No (0, 831) 
Yes (0,169) 
Yes (0,214) 
Yes (0,214) 
No (0, 970) 
No (0,786) 
Yes (0,169) 
No (0, 831) 
No (0,786) 
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8. The machine operator initiates the green light too soon. 
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89 
 
Initiate the green 
light too soon 
Fails to cancel the 
operation with 
green light too 
early 
Fails to cancel 
personnel 
transfer  
End result Probability 
 
 
 
  
                                                  
 
                                                  
                
 
                  
   
                      
                                                 
 
 
  
 
  
Yes (0,083) 
Yes (0,148) 
Yes (0,148) 
No (0,852) 
No (0,852) 
Potential accident      
(1, 8E-03) 
Potential accident      
(1, 1E-02) 
Potential accident      
(1, 1E-02) 
Potential accident      
(0,060) 
Potential accident      
(0,020) 
Potential accident      
(0,116) 
Potential accident      
(0,116) 
Potential accident      
in control (0,665) 
No (0, 851) 
Yes (0,149) 
Yes (0,148) 
Yes (0,148) 
No (0, 917) 
No (0,852) 
Yes (0,149) 
No (0, 851) 
No (0,852) 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
 
91 
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Appendix 4 
 
Models developed for collision probability estimation (Joanne Ellis 2005) 
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Appendix 5 
 
Access and regress 
There are different access methods to the wind turbine. These accesses are mainly 
categorized into 4: assess by helicopter, direct boat landing, crane hoist and boat landing 
with motion compensation.  Maintenance requires approximately 4 to 6 visit per year for 
each wind turbine. When access and egress is required the challenge is not only operational 
condition such as unfavorable wind and wave condition, but other factors like human error 
and equipment failures should also be taken into account from a HSE point of view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) of personnel falling from the wind turbine 
Personnel 
falling 
Operational 
condition 
Human error 
 
Equipment 
Failure 
Failure of 
thruster 
Procedures not 
being followed 
Insufficient skill or 
competency 
Use of unsuitable 
vessel 
Failure of 
rudder 
 
Poor visibility 
 
Extreme 
weather 
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As shown in Figure 8, the potential accident considered in this challenge is working 
personnel falling from the wind turbine when access is conducted by boat landing. This 
accident may occur during installation or when maintenance is required. If this happens 
during installation, there will be different actors getting involved in the accident cause: for 
example, working personnel, operator, contractor, supplier, etc. The working personnel can 
fall down from the turbine due to human error. The machine operator can make a mistake 
due to lack of training. The contractor may press the working personnel or machine operator 
due to the project timetable being fallen behind schedule. Other possible causes can be, for 
example, mechanical failure (hydraulic system failure or thruster failure) or sea state (strong 
wind or high wave).   
Human error 
Human error can be often a significant cause that plays the role and is considered to be the 
most contributing factor in a case of accident. The operator working at the sharp end is 
vulnerably exposed to risk and the operational contractor should consider that safe access 
cannot be achieved only by advanced technology and good operational condition, but it can 
also be limited by human factors. The human factors contributing the accident in this case 
could be often fatigue, bad commination, inadequate information etc. The operational 
contractor is responsible to give proper training and sufficient information to reduce the risk 
before the work is executed. Avoiding excessive work load should also be taken in to 
account. 
Equipment failure 
The main contributing factor to equipment failure is due to lack of maintenance. Proper 
maintenance to the equipment and vessel can reduce the risk. Using new advanced access 
equipment such as OAS can also reduce the risk.  
Operational condition 
This event includes bad operational condition due to extreme weather which may be due to 
unfavorable wave, wind or mist. Following rules and procedures, for example, should be 
adapted.   
95 
 
Appendix 6 
 
Copied from (Bridge, 2004)  
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